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Executive Summary
Efforts to combat and prevent illicit trafficking in, and proliferation and misuse of, small arms
and light weapons (SALW) are hampered by lack of relevant information-exchange and
transparency. International information exchange and transparency arrangements are key
elements of each of the main elements of the international action programme on SALW to be
launched at the UN 2001 Conference.
There is great scope to develop information management and distribution arrangements to
disseminate and exchange of relevant information on SALW without seriously compromising
national security, necessary commercial secrecy, or law enforcement. Indeed, national security,
commerce, crime prevention and law enforcement are generally enhanced by appropriate
transparency and information exchange
Inter-governmental exchange of information relating to SALW, including confidential exchanges,
can contribute in a number of important ways, including:
l Enabling effective co-operation amongst police, customs, or intelligence agencies or arms
transfer licensing authorities;
l Improving capacity to trace or prevent diversion to unauthorised or destabilising purposes,
including sanctions breaking activities;
l Improving capacity to monitor accumulations and flows of SALW;
l Promoting awareness and understanding of government efforts to implement the
international action programme, to help co-operation and to promote good practices; 
l Promoting awareness and understanding of specific needs, and thus contributing to
mobilisation of appropriate assistance;
l Enhancing mutual confidence in States’ commitment to prevent and reduce small arms
proliferation and to other international obligations such as full respect for UN arms
embargoes; and 
l Stimulating the development and maintenance of appropriate national monitoring,
record-keeping, and information management systems. 
In this context, transparency involves the provision of publicly available official information.
Transparency arrangements can play the same valuable roles as those of confidential
information exchange noted above. By making official information widely available, such
arrangements can bring additional benefits, including:
l Ensuring that all interested agencies and groups have access to, and can act upon,
relevant information;
l Enabling effective involvement of parliamentarians and civil society, helping to avoid
misleading or inaccurate reports, and promoting accountability;
l Mobilising efforts to ensure that national systems are in place for reliable and consistent
data-collection, record-keeping and reporting, and helping to ensure reliability through
wider scrutiny; and
l Helping to mobilise appropriate and timely international assistance. 
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Executive Summary
The Draft International Action Programme (L.4/Rev.1) includes significant text to promote
information exchange and transparency. These are welcome, and should at least be retained.
But experience shows that generalised commitments for enhanced information exchange may
not be enough. Positive and specific information exchange arrangements are needed at the
global level, so that governments have guidance on what information is requested from them,
and follow-up measures can be taken to remind and encourage governments to supply
appropriate information. These should complement and re-inforce any regional arrangements.
In this context, this Briefing recommends that particular attention be devoted to developing
information exchange and/or transparency measures in the following key areas: 
Information exchange arrangements to combat and prevent illicit arms
trafficking: Building upon the UN Firearms Protocol and recent regional and sub-regional
initiatives in this area, measures are needed to strengthen the capacity of Interpol and the
World Customs Union. These include upgrading and using the IWETS data-base system, and
ensuring that these or similar facilities are available for use to combat or prevent unauthorised
arms flows that contribute to the excessive and destabilising accumulation and spread of
SALW, particularly to regions of tension or conflict.
P romoting Co-operation in Tra c i n g : The commitments in the Draft Programme of A c t i o n
(L.4/Rev.1) relating to marking, record-keeping and tracing SALW are important and should all
be retained. In particular a follow-on process is needed to ensure information exchange relating
to marking and record-keeping systems and to negotiate a detailed agreement to ensure
effective co-operation in tracing. 
Global tra n s p a re n cy arra n gements for SALW, and the role of the UN
Register of C o nventional A rm s : Global transparency arrangements should be
developed relating to SALW. In this context, the possible role of the UN Register of
Conventional Arms needs clarification. There is wide support for expanding the seven
existing categories of weapons covered by the UN Register to at least include some types
of light weapons, such as medium and light mortars, grenade launchers or heavy machine
guns. However, consensus on such a development has not yet been achieved. There are
more doubts about whether it is useful and feasible to extend the UN Register to cover
small arms. Efforts to enhance global transparency relating to small arms could focus on a
new and specially designed arrangement. It would be valuable for the UN 2001 Conference
to launch a process to develop small arms transparency arrangements and to clarify the
possible role of the existing UN Register in this context. 
I n fo rm ation Exch a n ge Netwo rks on Small A rm s : Closely linked with the above,
the Draft programme of action (L4/Rev.1) includes a recommendation that regions develop
measures to enhance SALW transparency. This recommendation should be supported and
acted upon. The experience could then contribute to the development of a global mechanism
for exchanging information on SALW.
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Executive Summary
Stockpile Security and Reducing Surplus and Seized Weapons: Measures to
enhance arms stockpile security and to promote responsible disposal (particularly destruction)
of collected, surplus or seized weapons are key elements of the international action
programme on SALW. This needs to involve information exchanges between responsible
officials on current arrangements and problems, and exchanges of good practices and for
mobilising appropriate international assistance. Moreover, exchanges of information on
weapons collection and destruction programmes (including numbers of weapons seized,
collected or destroyed), and co-operation in monitoring public arms destruction events would
also be valuable
N ational Tra n s p a re n cy : Governments should not wait for international agreements before
taking measures to make more official information relating to SALW available to parliaments,
the public and to other governments. Despite the significant progress in national transparency
r e c e n t l y, unnecessary secrecy is still widespread. All countries should review their present
arrangements for making information in this area available to the public, to consider ways of
enhancing these arrangements. 
The main follow-on mechanisms proposed to promote implementation and further
development of the international action programme to be agreed at the UN 2001 Conference
are (a) a Follow-On Conference to be held in 2006 and (b) regular biennial meetings to
exchange information on national and regional actions. Extensive reporting and information
exchange will be vital to the success of these important meetings. Participating states,
regional and international organisations, and all other relevant organisations and groups,
should be encouraged to submit detailed reports on their relevant activities, policies and
measures to each of these meetings. Over time, it will be useful to develop some guidelines
on the minimum information to be included in such reports. 
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Introduction
Efforts to combat and prevent illicit trafficking in, and proliferation and misuse of, small arms
and light weapons (SALW) are hampered by lack of relevant information-exchange and
transparency. Official information concerning the production, stockpiling and transfer of SALW
is either non-existent or generally shrouded in excessive secrecy. Many governments do not
collect, maintain or exchange sufficient information even for their own national control purposes. 
The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects
(UN 2001 Conference) aims to agree on an international Programme of Action to prevent,
combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. In view
of the complexity of the problems of small arms proliferation, and the variety of factors
contributing to them, this international action programme needs to be comprehensive in scope.
It should establish a set of agreed principles, norms, standards, measures, programmes and
follow-on processes that can provide an adequate framework for national action and
international co-operation and assistance for years to come.
Principles and measures for international information exchange and transparency need to be
at the heart of the various co-operation measures included in the international action
programme if they are to be effective. Indeed, experience shows that information-exchange,
transparency and consultation are essential elements of real international co-operation
measures, in this and many other areas of concern. Without these elements, agreements on
such measures are likely to be merely symbolic. 
This briefing aims to identify and discuss the roles of information exchange and transparency
arrangements in an international action programme for SALW, and how provisions for the
development of such arrangements could be included in the Document to be agreed at the
UN 2001 Conference.
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The Contribution of Information Exchange 
and Transparency Arrangements
There are legitimate reasons for some secrecy relating to manufacture, procurement, holdings,
possession, sales and transfers of SALW. Information that would endanger national security or
legitimate commercial interests, or that undermines law-enforcement efforts, needs to be
treated confidentially. However, it is clear that there is excessive secrecy on these matters in
most countries. This undermines systems of accountability within each country. It also obstructs
inter-agency co-ordination and appropriate international co-operation. In many countries,
information that is essential for good and effective governance is not even effectively collected
and used by national authorities. 
There is normally substantial scope to develop information management and distribution
arrangements to permit dissemination and exchange of relevant information without
compromising national security, necessary commercial secrecy, or law enforcement. Indeed,
national security, commerce, crime prevention and law enforcement are generally enhanced
by appropriate transparency and information exchange.
Thus, it is generally unreasonable and in fact counter-productive to oppose outright the
development of information exchange or transparency arrangements relating to SALW on
grounds of national security. There is almost always a way of designing the guidelines for
information exchange in a way that does not significantly prejudice security while still
providing for useful sharing of information. Moreover, governments and companies with a
strong interest in gathering sensitive intelligence information about a country’s capabilities
can usually access much more information through covert means or systematic observation
of open sources than they can find in even a highly developed international information
exchange arrangement. Lack of agreed international exchanges barely affects intelligence
gathering by rivals, while seriously obstructing co-operation with partners. 
The problems of illicit arms trafficking and proliferation and misuse of SALW are complex,
and governments and other interested groups need to co-operate in many areas if they are
to tackle them eff e c t i v e l y. Information exchange and consultation are important in virtually all
of these areas. 
Exchange of information relating to SALW between governments can contribute in a number
of important ways, including:
l Enabling effective co-operation amongst police, customs, or intelligence agencies or
arms transfer licensing authorities;
l Improving capacity to trace or prevent diversion to unauthorised or destabilising purposes,
including sanctions breaking activities;
l Improving capacity to monitor accumulations and flows of SALW to facilitate timely action
to prevent excessive and destabilising accumulations and spread of such arms;
l Promoting awareness of, and learning about, government efforts to implement elements of
the international action programme, to help co-operation and co-ordination, and to identify
and promote good practices; 
l Promoting awareness and understanding of specific needs, and thus contributing to
mobilisation of appropriate assistance;
l Enhancing mutual confidence in States’commitment to co-operate in preventing, combating
and eradicating the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects, and to other international obligations
such as full respect for UN arms embargoes; and 
l Stimulating the development and maintenance of appropriate national monitoring,
record-keeping, and information management systems. 
Confidentiality
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The Contribution of Information Exchange 
and Transparency Arrangements
It should be noted that information exchanged between governments may remain confidential
and may not be made publicly available, in the interests of law-enforcement, justice, or legitimate
commercial secrecy as well as national security. In practice, for example, governments have
often been more willing to exchange confidential military information to potential adversaries
than to their own parliaments and citizens. This partly reflects the fact that decision-makers
are often at least as concerned that information will stimulate politically-sensitive debates
within their own countries as they are about possible damage to national security. 
Confidential inter-governmental information exchanges have an important role to play 
in an effective international action programme on SALW. But it is also important to develop
transparency arrangements. 
For the purposes of this briefing, transparency involves the provision of publicly available off i c i a l
information. Thus transparency relates to making official information available both among
governments and between governments and their parliaments and citizens. With regard to
SALW, this information could for example relate to some or all of the following: policies, laws,
arms reduction and control activities, or production, holdings, stockpiles, and transfers. 
Transparency is a key feature of democratic governance and open societies. Parliaments and
similar legislative bodies should have access to sufficient information to be able to exercise
appropriate oversight over the conduct of government policies. Citizens should as far as
possible have access to information that concerns their welfare and their society, and that
enables them to understand and contribute to national policies.
At the regional and international level, transparency arrangements can play a valuable role
in each of the ways noted above in relation to confidential information exchange: enabling
c o-operation, improving capacity and awareness, enhancing mutual confidence, and
stimulating development of appropriate national monitoring and control systems. Indeed,
making official information more widely available can bring additional benefits. 
Firstly, transparency facilitates wide dissemination of relevant information, so that all
interested agencies and groups can use it rather than just the narrow set of groups specified
in confidential exchanges. In practice, information disseminated on a ‘need to know’ basis
often does not actually reach the officials and organisations that could make good use of it. 
Secondly, the provision of publicly available information facilitates effective involvement of
parliamentarians and civil society. It promotes effective parliamentary oversight, because the
information becomes available to parliamentarians and provides a focus for legitimate
parliamentary debate. More widely, it enables citizens, NGOs, industry, media and other parts
of civil society to become properly involved in such debates. Availability of official information
helps to avoid false or misleading rumours and reports, and provides a firm basis for public
debate. By promoting accountability, transparency arrangements can also be expected to
enhance responsibility and restraint – for example with respect to manufacture and transfers
of SALW. 
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The Contribution of Information Exchange 
and Transparency Arrangements
Thirdly, decisions to provide regular information to parliaments or the public stimulate efforts
to ensure that national systems are in place for effective and reliable data collection,
record-keeping and reporting. The maintenance of systematic consistent, detailed and reliable
information - for example, on production, stocks and transfers of SALW – requires clear rules
and procedures and significant resources to collect, manage and disseminate relevant data.
Ad-hoc measures and excessive secrecy normally result in inconsistent, incomplete or
unreliable data. The obligation to provide regular and systematic reports stimulates
government and parliamentary efforts to ensure that adequate resources and procedures are
in place. Moreover, wider scrutiny can help to identify problems and inconsistencies, which
can then be investigated and rectified. 
It is important to note that inadequate or inconsistent national information systems relating to
SALW are a problem in all states, not just less developed ones. For example, information on
the USA’s annual exports of SALW is provided in a number of reports, including the 655
Report (prepared jointly by the Departments of State and Defense), the Annual report of the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), and annual customs reports from the US
Census Bureau. These reports are relatively detailed and transparent, but unfortunately the
information contained in them is not comparable and in places seemingly contradictory. The
fact that they are publicly available means that problems can be spotted and helps efforts
towards continual improvement. 
Fourthly, transparency can help to mobilise appropriate international assistance. One of the
greatest challenges in tackling SALW problems is to develop mechanisms that enable needs
to be rapidly identified and matched with those willing and able to help. If relevant official
information on the situation faced by a country, and on its policies and programmes, is publicly
available, it is relatively likely to reach a wide range of groups and agencies that are in a
position to assist. 
The contribution
of transparency
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The Draft International Action Programme
The Draft International Action Programme (L.4/rev.1)1 to be considered at the UN 2001
Conference includes significant text to promote information exchange and transparency. 
For example, Section II states that States should establish national points of contact for
inter-state and regional liaison (paras 3 and 24), and provide information on markings to
assist in identification and tracing of weapons (para 5). Regions are encouraged to establish
regional information sharing networks (para 27), and develop regional transparency measures
(para 30). The UN Secretariat is requested to collate and circulate national reports and other
information provided voluntarily by States (para 32). 
Similarly, section III encourages information exchange in many areas: for example, exchange
of experience and training among competent officials (paras 7, 8, 14, 15); information
exchange on marking systems (para 12) and tracing and detection technologies (para 10);
tracing co-operation (para 11); information exchange amongst regional organisations (para 5)
and enforcement agencies (para 9); and the development of research and resource centres
(para 18).
These provisions in the Draft action programme are all welcome. But experience shows that
generalised commitments for enhanced information exchange may not be enough. Positive
and specific arrangements are needed to ensure adequate information exchange and
transparency. The reality is that relevant ministries and agencies will not greatly enhance the
information they exchange with their counterparts in other States without the establishment of
agreed information exchange mechanisms or co-operation arrangements. This is particularly
the case for information that is presently considered to be confidential, or that is not at present
systematically collected. 
It is noteworthy that several states have proposed amendments to the Draft international
action programme (L4/rev 1) where it provides for information exchange and transparency.
For example, the Arab Group, China, and several other states have proposed inserting
phrases such as ‘on a voluntary basis’, ‘where appropriate’ and ‘whenever possible’ into the
draft provisions for transparency and information exchange in Section II, paragraphs 22 and
30. To a point, such proposals can be incorporated without significant weakening of the
Document. The whole Document to be agreed at the UN 2001 Conference will be politically
rather than legally binding, and in that sense implementation is voluntary. Reminders of the
voluntary nature of the information exchange arrangements can provide useful reassurance
and improve negotiability. 
However, it is important to learn from past experience of international calls for information
exchange. Many governments forget or neglect to provide the agreed information unless 
(i) relevant national officials and ministries know what information they should provide and
when and to whom it should be provided, and (ii) there are some (formal or informal)
arrangements for reminding and assisting governments to provide agreed submissions.
Vague calls for voluntary information exchange contained in a UN document are unlikely to
induce significant responses unless there is some follow-up. 
The Programme of Action agreed at the Conference in July should thus include some more
specific commitments to develop information exchange and transparency arrangements relating
to SALW at the global level, to complement and re-inforce any regional arrangements. Follow-up
meetings could then develop specific guidelines on the ways and means of implementing
such arrangements. Some key areas requiring attention are briefly discussed below. 
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Information exchange arrangements to combat 
and prevent illicit arms trafficking
There are several recent regional and sub-regional initiatives that include measures to
enhance information exchange amongst crime prevention and law enforcement agencies to
improve co-operation to combat and prevent illicit manufacture of, and trafficking in, SALW.
Examples include the 1997 OAS Convention, the EU Programme of Action (1997),
MERCOSUR agreement (1998), NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/Partnership for
Peace Work Programme (1999), the OSCE Document (2000), the Bamako Declaration (2000),
the Brasilia Declaration (2000), The Nairobi Initiative (2000), the SADC Declaration ( 2 0 0 1 ) ,
and programmes of ECOWAS and ASEAN. At a global level, the recently adopted UN
Protocol Against Illicit Manufacturing of, and Tr a fficking in, Firearms, their Parts and
Components and Ammunition (UN Firearms Protocol)2, should contribute substantially to
international information exchange and co-operation in this area.
Nevertheless, specific arrangements for information exchange to combat and prevent illicit
arms trafficking need to be established in the international action programme on small arms.
These should complement and re-inforce regional and global measures such as those
outlined above. Although the commitments of the UN Firearms Protocol will be valuable when
implemented, this Protocol is primarily a crime prevention and law enforcement agreement.
Its provisions for information exchange and co-operation apply to the prevention, investigation
and prosecution of transnational illicit arms trafficking where offences involve a transnational
criminal group. We need to look to the UN 2001 Conference process to ensure that similar
co-operation and information exchange takes place for combating and preventing lines of
supply of arms that contribute to the excessive and destabilising accumulation and spread of
SALW, particularly within regions of tension or conflict. 
The Draft Programme of Action (L.4/Rev.1) encourages States to use the facilities of Interpol,
in particular through the timely and complete provision of information to its International
Weapons and Explosives Tracking System (IWETS) database (Section III, para 9). This is a
valuable recommendation. However, it is important to recognise that the Interpol programme
to upgrade IWETS, so that data can be conveniently inputted and accessed using up-to-date
electronic communications, is behind schedule in part due to shortage of resources.
Moreover, the value of the database depends on the information put into it. Resources should
therefore be made available to ensure early and effective completion of the upgraded IWETS
system, and to encourage regular and complete information inputs. To this end, countries
should, for example, be encouraged as far as possible to place national firearms and SALW
databases on the IWETS system, or at least to ensure effective links. 
Moreover, co-operation through Interpol is customarily focussed on ‘ordinary’ criminal
investigations. Interpol tends to avoid becoming involved in more politicised investigations
relating larger arms shipments, for example to conflict regions. States at the UN 2001
Conference should consider including a clear statement clarifying that Interpol should
contribute to co-operation in combating and preventing all types of criminal activity, including
investigations into unauthorised flows of weapons to conflict regions. Alternatively (or in
addition), States should consider establishing facilities and databases that are closely linked
to Interpol but sufficiently distinct from it to enable them to be used to assist with efforts to
combat and prevent dubious arms shipments contributing to excessive and destabilising
accumulations and transfers of SALW. Further arrangements may also be needed for
information exchange to assist global co-operation amongst customs, police, intelligence,
licensing and arms control officials. 
10
Information exchange arrangements to combat 
and prevent illicit arms trafficking
Furthermore it should be noted that the Draft Programme of Action contains specific
recommendations relating to the enforcement of UN Security Council arms embargoes.
These are detailed under Section I, para 10 and Section III, paras 14 and 31. The eff e c t i v e
provision of information between state law enforcement agencies, Interpol and the relevant
UN embargo enforcement bodies will be a crucial factor determining the success or failure
of such effective embargo enforcement. 
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Promoting Co-operation in Tracing
The Draft Programme of Action (L.4/Rev.1) includes commitments to establish agreed
international standards for marking and record-keeping, and to establish an agreement to ensure
co-operation in tracing sources and lines or supply of arms that contribute to illicit trafficking
in, and proliferation of, SALW. These are important commitments that should be retained. 
To promote effective co-operation in tracing, information exchange arrangements are needed
on national marking systems, so that authorities investigating SALW of concern can readily
use the marks for tracing purposes. The UN Firearms Protocol established a compromise on
national marking systems, so that states that do not at present use alpha-numeric marking
systems can retain their own system provided that the marks are unique and adequate for
tracing purposes. But it is essential that marks can at least be identified and communicated by
investigating officials. Information exchange systems, and an international database clarifying
the characteristics of different national marking systems need to be established for this purpose.
Specific commitments and procedures for cooperation in tracing investigations would need to
be established through detailed agreements. These would be considered as part of the
negotiation process for an international instrument to identify and trace lines of supply of SALW.
As discussed in Biting the Bullet Briefing Paper No 5,3 such an international agreement would
necessarily include detailed arrangements for the exchange of information. There is an
important commitment in the Draft Programme of Action (L.4/Rev.1, Chapter IV, para 1 
c) to launch such negotiations as an immediate follow-up to the UN 2001. This follow-on
commitment is important, and should be retained.
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Global transparency arrangements for SALW, 
and the role of the UN Register of Conventional Arms
It is necessary to clarify the possible role of the UN Register of Conventional Arms in promoting
transparency in relation to SALW. At present, the seven categories of weapons covered by this
UN Register are restricted to major weapons systems, such as battle tanks, combat aircraft,
heavy artillery, and naval vessels. They do not at present include SALW.4 However there have
been numerous calls for the categories of the Register to be revised and extended. This issue
was considered in detail in the year 2000, for example, by the UN Group of Governmental
Experts on the operation and further development of the Register.5 It is now clear that there are
several practical and useful ways in which the existing categories could be revised, although it
may take some time to achieve political consensus in support of their implementation.
With political support, it would be relatively straightforward to revise the categories of the
UN Register to include at least some types of light weapons, including medium and light
mortars, grenade launchers or heavy machine guns. These types of weapons play a major
role in contemporary conflicts, as illustrated for example in recent wars in the Balkans and
the Horn of Africa. Their inclusion in the UN Register would pose no special technical or
administrative challenges. 
There are more questions about the value and feasibility of covering small arms such as
pistols or assault rifles in the UN Register. These are traded in relatively large volumes from a
relatively wide variety of sources, and a significant part of the international trade in such arms
is civilian and between or amongst non-state actors. Thus their inclusion could imply significant
administrative burdens on States. In itself, this is not a convincing argument against extending
the UN Register to include small arms. If governments do not already maintain good records
on their transfers, procurement and holdings of small arms, they should begin to do so for the
purposes of appropriate national regulation and control. 
However, it may be a higher priority to establish different arrangements to promote
transparency for small arms. The UN Register is designed in a specific way to reflect its focus
on confidence-building and its historical focus on major conventional weapons systems. For
small arms, transparency arrangements may be better designed to support efforts to combat
and prevent illicit trafficking and prevent and reduce small arms proliferation and misuse. 
If so, the UN 2001 Conference should express this need, and call for the establishment of
voluntary UN transparency arrangements for small arms designed to contribute to the
implementation of the international action programme. As a follow-up measure, the UN
General Assembly could establish a Group of Governmental Experts to develop
recommendations on how this could be developed. 
In any case, it would be valuable for the UN 2001 Conference and the UN General Assembly
to provide guidance on the division of labour between the development of the UN Register of
Conventional Arms and of any new transparency arrangements for small arms. Recently,
transparency proposals relating to small arms have often been referred backwards and
forwards between the two processes.
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Information Exchange Networks on Small Arms 
Reports of the United Nations and regional organisations, as well as analyses from research
institutes and NGOs, have documented how secrecy (or inadequate data collection, information
exchange and transparency) obstructs efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in SALW,
not least by impeding efforts to prevent diversion of legal arms to unauthorised purposes. 
In this regard, the Draft Programme of Action (L.4/Rev.1) includes a recommendation that
regions develop appropriate measures to enhance transparency with respect to SALW
transfers, as a confidence building measure and with a view to combating their illicit trade
(Section II, para 30). This valuable recommendation builds upon previous recommendations
that regions consider establishing ‘regional registers’on small arms and light weapons. The
UN and other relevant bodies should offer all appropriate assistance in the development of
such regional arrangements. 
However, in line with the discussion above, voluntary transparency arrangements of this sort
should also be considered at the global level. Such information exchange could begin with
exchanges of information on national laws, regulations and procedures relating to transfer,
production, possession, procurement and holdings of SALW, together with national contact
points to facilitate follow-on enquiries. This could usefully be supplemented with specific
information on issues of specific concern, such as regulations relating to arms brokering
activities, or policies relating to the identification and disposal of surplus arms. Ultimately,
these global transparency arrangements should be developed to include annual information
on volume of transfers, procurement from national production, and holdings of SALW, which
could be submitted annually to the UN Secretary-General, to be compiled and disseminated
by the Department for Disarmament Affairs. 
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Stockpile Security and Reducing Surplus 
and Seized Weapons 
Programmes and measures to enhance arms stockpile security and to promote responsible
disposal of collected, surplus or seized weapons must be key elements of the international
action programme on SALW (as discussed in Biting the Bullet Briefing No 3 6). National
regional and international programmes to identify and rectify problems and to develop and
promote good practice are central to efforts in this area. These will involve standard setting
processes and also international assistance projects. Information exchange will be essential
to such efforts.
Much of the information exchange in this context should take the form of detailed exchanges
between responsible officials on current arrangements and problems and exchanges of good
practices. Similarly, countries requesting assistance will necessarily exchange detailed
information with partners that provide assistance. 
However, there is scope for further systematic information exchange and transparency
arrangements in these areas. For example, states could be requested, on a voluntary basis,
to provide regular information on their weapons collection and destruction programmes,
including information on numbers and types of weapons that have been seized, collected or
destroyed. These could be developed on a global as well as on a regional basis. They could
usefully be linked with invitations to observe destruction events, to promote awareness and
enhance public confidence that the weapons have been appropriately destroyed.
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National Transparency 
Governments should not wait for regional or global agreements before taking measures to
make more official information relating to SALW available to parliaments, the public or to
other governments. 
C u r r e n t l y, at least 60 states are regularly involved in the legal export of SALW, while almost
all countries in the world are involved in the legal import of SALW and occasional export of
surplus second hand weapons. About 30 countries provide public information on their annual
arms transfers; normally in the form of report to parliament.7 However only three states
(USA, Italy and UK) provide systematic public information on both the value and volume of
their transfers of SALW by country destination. 
In addition to national export reports, at least 33 countries currently provide information on
both imports and experts of SALW to the COMTRADE database: an international customs
database administered by the UN Statistical Division. However, a number of the world’s major
exporters of SALW, including Bulgaria, Israel and the Russian Federation, do not submit data
to COMTRADE.8
Despite the significant progress in national transparency initiatives in recent years,
unnecessary secrecy is still widespread. There is a need for all countries to review their
present arrangements for making available to the public relevant official information relating
to SALW and the implementation of regional initiatives and the international action
programme, and to consider ways of enhancing these arrangements. The principle should
be adopted that such information should be made available unless there are clear reasons
to maintain confidentiality on grounds of national or commercial secrecy, law enforcement
or privacy relating to personal information. 
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Reporting for Follow-on Meetings 
The Draft Programme of Action provides for the convening of a Review Conference in 2006
to consider progress in implementing the agreed action programme, and for more regular
biennial meetings to exchange information on national and regional actions to combat and
prevent illicit trafficking and reduce and prevent excessive and destabilising accumulations
of SALW. These follow-on meetings are very important. Participating states, and all other
relevant organisations and groups, should be encouraged to submit reports on their activities
and relevant policies and measures to each of these meetings. It may be useful over time to
develop some guidelines on the information that could usefully be included in reports to
these review meetings. 
However, a major theme of this paper is that these reports should by no means be the only
information exchange arrangements. Enhanced information exchange and transparency
should begin to develop immediately after the UN 2001 Conference.
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Conclusion
International and regional information exchanges amongst governments and other relevant
organisations will be very important for the implementation of the commitments and
co-operative measures agreed in the international action programme on SALW, just as they
are vital for effective regional or bilateral co-operation. Specific provisions for such information
exchanges should therefore be included in the international action programme to be agreed at
the UN 2001 Conference. Follow-on processes will be vital to ensure that the agreed
information exchange arrangements become a reality and are implemented.
Similarly, transparency needs to be enhanced in this area – that is the provision of publicly
available official information relating to SALW and to progress in implementing agreed
international and regional action programmes. Such transparency can have substantial
benefits over and above confidential information exchange amongst governments. 
The Draft Document L4 Rev 1, to be considered at the UN 2001 Conference, contains several
useful commitments and programmes to enhance information exchange and transparency.
These need to be retained and strengthened further in several respects. The primary aim of
information exchange and transparency in this context is to enhance co-operation and
accountability. Thus they may be considered voluntary, except where they are part of existing
or emerging legally binding commitments. However, provisions and guidelines are needed to
induce and encourage appropriate reporting. Real improvements in information exchange and
transparency are needed for if the international action programme to be launched at the UN
2001 Conference is to be effective. 
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